Bound to the Mimetic or the Transformative? Considering Other Possibilities
Abstract: Philip Jackson’s “The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative
Outlooks on Teaching” is widely read both inside and outside of philosophy
of education circles and courses, and is best known for sketching out the
long-standing difference between the mimetic and transformative traditions
in teaching. In this paper I argue that we need to move beyond the
mimetic/transformative divide and to a new tradition of teaching. I make the
case that Jackson’s understanding of assessment and adaptive education are
unduly limiting, and this is what keeps his thinking bound to a dualism that
needs to be reconstructed. Once reconstructed, new possibilities for
philosophers of education, teacher educators and teachers are disclosed.
In this paper I revisit what I take to be one of the most influential papers written by
a philosopher of education in recent memory, Philip Jackson’s “The Mimetic and the
Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching.”1 Jackson’s paper is widely read
both inside and outside of philosophy of education circles and courses, and is best
known for sketching out the long-standing difference between the mimetic and
transformative traditions in teaching.2 Although Jackson recognizes that almost
every form of teaching has aspects of mimesis and transformation, when we think
about practices of teaching, one tradition is generally more dominant than the other.
Mimetic teaching aims to reproduce or replicate some existing standard and
transformative teaching is responsive to the unknown and the unforeseeable in the
triangular relationship between student, teacher and subject.3 Instead of leading
students to some preordained and foreseen end, transformative teaching aims to
free students for possibilities of growth and development that are impossible to
determine in advance.
Presciently, Jackson saw that the growing standards and accountability
movement—backed by new technologies and a fervent positivistic belief in the
power of assessment—would lead to a resurgence in the belief that mimetic
teaching should be chosen over transformative teaching. Instead of aiming for
amorphous and difficult to quantify goals like moral development or creative
experimentation on the part of students, emerging technologies of assessment—
with a promise that students could be led to learn anything that could be
reproduced—allowed mimetic teaching to dominant the imagination—often driven
by fear—of what teaching should be. With a nation’s educational system at risk, why
work on transformation that is difficult to facilitate and even more difficult to
deliver on, when mimetic teaching would allow students to learn what they need to
know in order to be productive earners and citizens? This is Jackson’s deep concern.
A concern that very few people would choose the transformative over the mimetic,
and so we might land in the position we are in now, thirty years after Jackson’s
prophetic essay. Who can doubt that the mimetic tradition of teaching has not
become dominant in educational practices? Instead of attempting the difficult work
of letting students sit with ambiguity, teachers feel forced to teach to tests. Instead
of allowing students the time it takes to develop into who they are meant to—or
aspire to— become, students are captured by how well they can game a test and

reproduce what is expected. Examples go on in countless directions. And though
many teachers continue to hold onto transformative ideals and find ways to enact
them in practice, they often do so through strenuous efforts of will and imagination,
and often at great risk to their livelihood.4 As Doris Santoro convincingly
demonstrates, good teachers are leaving the profession—she evocatively labels
them conscientious objectors—because transformative teaching has almost no
officially—or politically—valued place in our time.5
I return to Jackson’s essay not only because of its prescience, but because he
begins his essay hoping that the mimetic and transformative traditions might be
brought closer together. Instead of choosing between one form of teaching over the
other, Jackson hoped that he could—at least conceptually—find a way to bring the
best of both traditions together.6 As Dewey argues in Experience and Education, we
shouldn’t be forced into deciding between the “old” versus the “new” in education,
we should seek what is worthy of the name education. I see Jackson attempting
something similar in his essay: instead of choosing between the mimetic and the
transformative, he wants us to seek out what is worthy of the name teaching. And,
what is worthy of the name teaching can only come about if we move beyond the
mimetic/transformative dualism and to our next better attempt at finding—or
founding—a tradition of teaching.
Although Jackson begins “The Mimetic and the Transformative” on a hopeful
note, the essay ends pessimistically, and understandably so. Jackson is able to
imagine and recall individual teachers who find ways to enact what is good in both
traditions, the traditions—as traditions—seem fixed in place with the mimetic in the
dominant—if not almost exclusive—position. In Jackson’s age as in ours, the
opportunities for transformative teaching are few and undervalued. As such, I read
his essay as something of a call—one especially directed to philosophers of
education—to keep the transformative tradition of teaching alive, because it seems
nearly impossible—given the hold mimetic teaching has on an imagination driven
by fear of America’s “failing” schools—to get a hearing for the tradition of
transformative teaching. Without this type of hearing, it will be impossible to
develop a tradition of teaching that brings together what is good in both the
transformative and mimetic traditions. Though he doesn’t make it fully apparent
that the transformative needs to be defended in “The Mimetic and the
Transformative”—he does this in “Facing Our Ignorance”7—as readers work
through Jackson’s essay I find it hard to believe that many would want to be on the
side of the Sophists against Socrates, or on the side of the fillers of vessels versus the
artists and creators. Maybe unintentionally—or maybe because of the very real
pressures poised to choke out the transformative tradition of teaching—Jackson
seems to foreclose the possibility of forging a new tradition of teaching that
combines what is good in both traditions, because he finds it almost impossible to
find a way to enact the transformative in the mimetic era we continue to live in.
It is especially at this point that I find it important to return to Jackson
because if he offers little hope of bringing the mimetic and transformative traditions
of teaching, doesn’t this consign those of us who stand for the transformative
tradition to be forever outside of conversations that dominate our educational era?
That is, if the transformative tradition doesn’t have a voice in the mimetic era we are

living in, where does this leave philosophers of education? If many philosophers of
education are on the side of transformative traditions in teaching, and therefore
outside of dominant educational discourses, is it a surprise that philosophers of
education often wonder about relevance, audience and purpose?8 In print and in
informal conversations, philosophers of education struggle with the role that we can
play in the types of conversation that dominate our educational era. Though it may
be—to echo Emerson—great to be misunderstood,9 what if there is more to mimetic
teaching than Jackson sees? In particular, what if Jackson’s concern that new
technologies of assessment that give the mimetic tradition of power its newfound
power might be something that can be used to transformative ends? That is, might
there be ways for reconstructed mimetic assessments to facilitate the aims of
transformative teaching? Answering this question is the main goal of this paper.
To be clear, I certainly don’t believe that transformative teaching should be
subsumed to mimetic ones. The mimetic era, guided by narrow visions of
assessment and accountability—as countless scholars inside and outside philosophy
of education have demonstrated10—is mis-educative, and we have to do everything
possible to reassert the aims of transformative teaching. But, I worry that Jackson
doesn’t do enough to work through dissolving surface differences between the
mimetic and transformative traditions in teaching, and this is tied to his too narrow
view of assessment and its role in teaching.11 Again, Jackson was importantly
prescient in his worry that assessment would play the role it now plays in
education: largely punitive; largely superficial (choosing to measure what is easy to
measure rather than what actually matters); largely in service of mimetic teaching.
But, as a philosopher of education, I would have loved to see Jackson’s keen and
critical intelligence think more about how assessment might foster transformative
teaching. If Jackson could have found more ways to show how the transformative is
held nascent within ostensibly mimetic teaching, then more could have been done to
assert the transformative, but from inside of dominant conversations. This is the
main goal of my paper. My aim is to suggest that we can come closer to the tradition
of teaching Jackson hoped to discover in his essay through a rethinking of the
possibilities of assessment, and—as a possible consequence of doing this—offer
philosophers of education interesting opportunities to reengage with the broader
educational community.12
Jackson’s Understanding of Assessment and Its Limitations
In “The Mimetic and the Transformative” assessment is often only addressed
indirectly, but I see it looming in the background at many turns. Jackson criticizes
the growing teacher accountability movement, criticizes the fact that we often only
measure what can be easiest measured and so teach what can be most efficiently
transmitted to students, and he relatedly worries a great deal about the “gradual
emergence and the ultimate hegemony of a “scientific spirit” within the educational
community.”13 To get a fuller picture of Jackson’s thinking on assessment, one needs
to follow a footnote. The footnote comes at the end of this passage:

Those who look upon the growth of the mimetic tradition as an
unadulterated good or close to that….view the decline of the transformative
tradition with equal delight. They believe it rids the teaching profession of
unnecessary sentimentality and mystifying talk about vague notions like
character and virtue and at the same time removes yet another roadblock
toward making the practice of teaching more objective and precise and its
results more measurable.14
This is a key point. Jackson almost always links assessment to something like a
positivist worldview and he also sees assessment as antithetical to an appreciative
understanding of character and virtue in education. While there are some in
education who may see talk of character as pointless and misleading and who do
believe that the goal of assessment is to achieve the certainty of positivist
objectivity, I don’t think this is anything like the whole story. Someone committed to
using assessment as a means to improving education15 is not necessarily committed
to a belief that assessment is objective, and she is certainly not committed to a world
where character and virtue are banished from schooling and education.16 Jackson’s
way of telling the story establishes a faulty dualism that only reinforces a
mimetic/transformative divide. Here is where the footnote linked to the passage is
important. Jackson references a published exchange with Robert Glaser17 and it is in
this exchange where we most clearly see the limitations of Jackson’s thinking on
assessment and how it only serves to solidify the mimetic/transformative divide.
In “Private Lessons in Public Schools: Remarks on the Limits of Adaptive
Instruction,” Jackson both introduces the terms mimetic and transformative, and
focuses on the role that assessment plays in privileging the mimetic at the expense
of exploring and cultivating education’s transformative possibilities. It is important
to note the “adaptive” (or what is also referred to as “cybernetic”) teaching is the
most current iteration of the mimetic tradition. While adaptive should not be taken
to encompass all instances of mimetic teaching, in many ways, adaptive education—
facilitated by new technologies and new assessment technologies—is, to Jackson,
mimetic education in its most seductive and pernicious form. Jackson has two key
criticisms of how adaptive education makes assessment central to learning. First,
Jackson is highly skeptical of adaptive models of teaching because adaptive
instruction, given Jackson’s understanding of it, is premised on a belief that
education has to be broken down into manageable steps in order for learning to
happen.18 Second, Jackson believes adaptive education, driven as it is by assessment,
is necessarily mimetic because there are too many educational objectives and
aspirations that simply cannot be assessed. According to Jackson, when we focus on
assessment we are always—even if unintentionally—devaluing transformative
goals and aspirations.
Here is how Jackson describes adaptive education: “Reduced to its simplest
terms, [adaptive education] calls for comparing the student’s performance with
some standard of what is desired—evaluating the “match” between that
performance and the educational environment, as Glaser puts it—and then deciding
what to do on the basis of that comparison.”19 Jackson uses the example of the
relationship between a piano teacher and her pupil to stand as exemplary of

adaptive education. The piano teacher knows how the piece should be performed,
and she judges the student’s performance against that standard. If the student meets
the standard, teacher and pupil can move forward. But, if the student falters, the
teacher localizes errors and missteps, and adapts her instruction to make sure that
the student overcomes those errors and so meets the standard. This will generally
mean practicing a specified section of the piece in order to successfully perform the
entire piece proficiently.
Jackson makes the piano teaching example analogous to adaptive instruction in
general. Jackson writes:
the fundamental principles [of adaptive education] are:





divide a complex learning task into its component parts,
get the student to work on each part sequentially,
monitor his performance, matching it against some standard of what is
desired, and
make such corrections as are necessary to bring the performance in line
with the model (the latter set of actions being accomplished by a variety
of means, sometimes involving the teacher and something not.)

The most rudimentary form of these adaptive principles I shall call “mimetic,”
meaning imitative. I do so because, when stripped of all their embellishments—
as in the piano teaching example—their fundamental aim is to get the student to
reproduce or imitate in his own actions or words a form of behavior that has
already been settled upon.20
As a description of adaptive instruction, this is relatively fair. A teacher who adapts
her instruction has a clear instructional goal in mind—to follow Jackson’s example,
the student will play a piece of music proficiently—and then creates tasks and
opportunities that allow the student to progress toward meeting this goal—the
student begins with the opening, or with the easier parts of the piece, and then
moves on to other parts of the piece or begins to work on the more difficult parts of
the piece—and then the instructor assesses whether the student plays the piece
well or needs to go back to one of the steps in order to play the piece well as
measured against a clear standard of excellence. If the student is successful, she will
reproduce or imitate what the teacher has in mind when she started her instruction.
I note that Jackson’s description of adaptive instruction is only relatively fair
because a teacher can adapt instruction without decomposing a goal into steps that
must be worked on sequentially, and there are important educational goals that
don’t need to be mimetic (or imitative) in order for a teacher to adapt her
instruction as a means to allowing students to meet these goals. For example, a
teacher can set the (relatively underspecified) goal of helping students understand
the importance of appreciating the pulls of patriotism (or regionalism, or
sectarianism) in many national and international conflicts without having to clearly
define what these terms mean or dividing how a student reaches this understanding

into precise steps. Developing an understanding of complex ideas and concepts
doesn’t necessarily come in steps; a single transformative moment or educational
experience (facilitated by a teacher’s understanding of her student based on her use
of formal and informal assessments) can develop it. Assessment and adaptive
instruction—in this type of example—looks less like the work of Jackson’s piano
teacher, or steps in a computer program (something Jackson often compares
adaptive instruction to), and more like the work of an educator Jackson might
describe as transformative.21 For example, as a teacher I might share the written
personal testimony of a participant in a conflict, or a documentary that makes a
conflict real for a student in ways that other means of instruction cannot, in order to
help a student progress toward my instructional goal. I don’t need to break the
development of understanding into steps that every single student marches
through. But, just because I do not break my instruction into steps, it doesn’t mean
that I—as a teacher—am not consistently assessing students and using the results of
my assessment to adapt learning opportunities in ways that will allow each student
to more successfully meet my goals. I have an end in mind—sophisticated
understanding—and I use feedback and assessment to help students achieve that
end in whatever manner works best for that particular student.22
Not only does adaptive instruction not need to progress sequentially, its
goals needn’t be as limited (and limiting) as Jackson sees them. Jackson seems to
believe that the only goals fit for adaptive instruction are mimetic ones. That is, the
teacher needs to have a precise and uniform goal in mind for students in order to
successfully adapt her instruction. A baseball player hitting a home run, a piano
player playing a piece in conformity with expectations, a student successfully using
algorithms to solve problems with a clear answer; these are the examples Jackson
has in mind and these are the types of examples that circumscribe his
understanding. He writes, “Instead of worrying about how teachers will know when
their students have mastered this or that objective—an orientation that causes our
thoughts to flow naturally in the direction of behaviorism and associated
ideologies—we need ask whether there may not be some desirable outcomes of
schooling that are not particularly well served by being translated into precise
terms.”23 Behaviorism. According to Jackson, this is the mentality that a teacher is
bound to when she sets a goal and uses assessment to empower students to reach it.
While there may be some who see adaptive instruction this way, the
characterization is—ultimately—misleading, or at least unhelpfully limited. And, I
feel that Jackson’s attempt to offer counterexamples does little to help his case. That
is, Jackson argues that adaptive instruction ultimately fails because there are just
too many educational goals that do not fit an adaptive paradigm. As I hope to show,
this is not the case.
First, Jackson argues that there are many instructional moments when a
teacher doesn’t focus on student learning. He gives the example of lectures, and
argues that the lecturer isn’t primarily concerned “if the material is getting across.”
Jackson goes on to ask: “Shall we accuse him of being a poor teacher for his lack of
interest in such matters?”24 What follows is likely a contentious claim, but I am of
the mind that a lecturer should not be characterized as a teacher unless she is
concerned with whether or not her students learn what she intends to teach. That is,

if a teacher lectures a group of students, gives an assessment, and finds that very
few students understood what she was lecturing on, then she needs to adapt her
instruction so that students gain the intended understanding. While a lecture that
inspires, or evokes, or entertains has all kinds of value, in order to qualify as
instruction (and the lecturer a teacher) there needs to be a goal and the speaker
must care if her audience realizes her goal. Jackson—I feel—anticipates this type of
objection, and so makes his second point. Jackson argues that there are many cases
of education we value where a teacher is “effecting in his students a change whose
precise form cannot be determined in advance and whose “rightness” or
“wrongness” cannot be judged even when the change is made manifest.”25 I am not
sure I can agree with this.
It is surely the case that many things we value in education do not have a
precise form that can be determined in advance. When we ask a child to write a
poem, or to use an equation to pose—and not solve simple—problems, or to offer
interpretations of historical events, teachers cannot know with any type of certainty
what the student will do, and teachers often do not have a precise vision in mind of
what a “correct” performance will look like. But, this doesn’t mean that the
“rightness” or “wrongness” of what is made manifest cannot be judged and—
importantly—improved through the teacher’s use of assessment. Do we really
believe that we cannot judge the quality of a student poem, or a student’s use of
mathematics, or a student’s ability to offer a sophisticated interpretation of
historical events? If we don’t, then why do we offer students grades on these types
of things? Though it may be hard to offer the types of feedback that allow students
who don’t initially perform well to perform better, I think it is unhelpful—and
ultimately unprofessional practice as a teacher—to express or communicate to a
student that no amount of feedback we give as a teacher will allow the student to
meet the imprecise standard we are nonetheless grading her on. Teachers shouldn’t
both pretend that their educational goals are ineffable while praising—through
grades, feedback, recommendations, etc.—students who meet these goals and
punishing students who do not. To put the point more positively, think about those
teachers who facilitate opportunities for students to see success, either through
rubrics or exemplars,26 and who are able to give the types of feedback and create the
type of learning environment where the balance between freedom and discipline
lead to a high percentage of successful performances for a great diversity of
learners. These teachers find ways to step students through a process that leads to
success, even in acts that are impossible to specify what success precisely looks like
in advance of the moment when the teacher begins facilitating student learning.
Even if these criticisms are compelling, it is important to consider the full
weight of Jackson’s conclusion. He argues that if we make monitoring student
progress toward a goal “central to what teaching is all about, [then] a would-be
profession remains no more than a trade. More serious than that, if our notions of
teaching should ever be confined to what has herein been described as mimetic
principles, the ultimate loser will not be the teachers, but those taught.”27 This is
important. Should we conflate education with feedback and assessment? Even as we
think about this question, I also can’t help but feel that Jackson’s picture of adaptive
instruction is overly influenced by his making computer instruction adaptive

instruction’s closest analog. That is, if we imagine teachers reading scripts that are
meant to progress students sequentially toward a clearly defined goal, then teaching
is not a profession, and students will likely suffer. And, given this vision of teaching
and learning it seems like we might easily replace teachers with computers. But, as
compelling as this line of thinking might be,28 it is not a fair or accurate description
of adaptive education. Adaptive teaching is about a teacher knowing student and
subject well enough to create connections that allow the highest number of students
to achieve ambitious learning goals.29 More, I would argue that students suffer more
in an un-adaptive environment and teaching remains de-professionalized when
everyone involved in teaching isn’t thinking enough about how we can use
assessment to improve learning outcomes for every student. Though talk of learning
outcomes and student improvement may appear overly mimetic, this needn’t be the
case.
Adaptive education is—when we can look at it through a lens not overly
influenced by things like computing metaphors—what every student deserves, and
it is philosophically defeasible. It is certainly not bound to the mimetic tradition, and
it is not destined to be non-transformative. In his response to Jackson, Robert Glaser
makes key points worth considering. First, Glaser writes, “Feedback of information
is a primary mechanism of human growth, development and evolution. In fact, it is
the non-cybernetic models of learning we have most to fear, because they are
insensitive to making teaching adaptive to the style and intellect of students.”30 I
have to agree with Glaser. We have more to fear when teachers tout the ineffability
of what they are teaching and do little to help a student progress toward that
understanding. Importantly, this needn’t look like a computer program adapting to
student performance; leading the student along a sequence to a predetermined
conclusion. It will often look—to take Jackson’s exemplar of transformative
teaching—Socratic in nature. Here I am thinking of a concerned teacher adapting his
or her instruction to the needs of students in the pursuit of meaningful ends. Glaser
notes, “models of excellence exist, but variations on it are counted as intellectual
inventions and artistic improvisations that encourage the development of human
intellectual endeavor, problem solving, and thinking. Certainly, mimetic principles
are supplanted by exploratory ones in this conception.”31 To return to examples I
offer above, we do know excellence in poetry, even though we don’t have formulas
for creating poems; we know what the creative utilization of math looks like, even
though we can’t directly transmit this knowledge (mimetically) to students; and, we
know creative and insightful historical interpretation, even though no algorithms
exist for its creation. But, we can help students develop this understanding, and can
develop student understanding by offering exemplars and providing feedback as
students work toward exemplary performance. As Glaser notes, there are “many
situations [where] teachers do not have algorithms. But certainly, good teachers
have heuristics.”32
As I hope to have demonstrated, there is so much that Jackson gets right, but
he does get adaptive education wrong. Though there are ways in which adaptive
education can be formulaic and bound to mimetic principles, when we push at the
meaning of adaptive education, it is clear that what might be described as mimetic is
indeed transformative. These examples, I believe, help us overcome the

mimetic/transformative divide. When we set ambitious—even if hard to define—
goals and use consistent informative feedback tied to those goals to assist students
in the realization of these goals, the line between transformative and mimetic
becomes blurred. This blurring is important because instead of judging—through
grades and other means—students against a standard we do not teach but which is
nonetheless controlling, we use assessment and feedback to empower students to
make progress toward the standard. Every student deserves the opportunity to
experience the transformative dimensions of learning; holding that there is really no
way to teach toward the standards that we most value seems problematic at best. In
the final section I expand this line of thought with reference to examples that
demonstrate how assessment and adaptive education harbor transformative
possibilities for teaching, teachers and learners.
Assessment, Adaptive Instruction and Teaching Worthy of the Name33
One aspect of “The Mimetic and the Transformative” that I find particularly
provocative and important is Jackson’s belief that students from current and
historically underserved student populations receive overly mimetic (in the most
pejorative sense of the word) forms of education.34 It is important to be critical of
this.35 Terms like drill and control come to mind when we think about educating
other people’s children. This way of putting the issue—I hope—calls to mind Lisa
Delpit’s powerful thinking.36 While Delpit is critical of mimetic education in its
pejorative sense, she also reminds us that not making something explicit is a certain
type of injustice. Here is where I think we can continue to push the
mimetic/transformative divide by using the lens of assessment. Do things like
rubrics and assignment guidelines level down learning,37 or do they democratize
and transform it? I think we might agree that drill and control can be extremely
negative, but we have to wonder what happens when we leave unwritten—but
ultimately controlling—cultural narratives and norms untaught and
unacknowledged. When we don’t teach students these, not only do we not empower
students, we leave that which is untaught in the dominant position. This is what I
take to be one of Delpit’s most important points, and one that philosophers of
education should think through. It is difficult to see how we can empower students
to overcome controlling narratives and norms by leaving those norms and
narratives untaught. Though we may disagree with the norms and narratives and
though we know it is unjust that they are controlling in the ways that they are, they
should not be ignored. It is difficult to overcome a problem we don’t acknowledge.
Instead of holding to a belief that pretending or wishing that norms and narratives
don’t exist is enough to make them go away, we need to address them squarely.
Succeeding in an unjust society should be seen as the difficult thing that it is. If we
do not live in acknowledgement of the dominant norms and narratives, success is
difficult if not impossible; but, if we succeed in an unjust society, then we are
comprised. We should not pretend that this is not the case. Instead of pretending,
we need to make our norms and narratives explicit. This is a step toward
transformation, even if the move can feel mimetic. Though the master’s tools may
never dismantle the master’s house—to draw on the title of the masterful essay by

Audre Lorde—we need to know how the master’s world works in order to develop
the tools necessary to dismantle it. We need to spell out the un-spelled out in order
to empower students and engage in transformative critique. A type of teaching that
can feel overly mimetic and non-transformative, when viewed through the lens of
the work of someone like Lisa Delpit can seem quite different. One can help effect a
transformation for students through teaching that may appear squarely within the
mimetic tradition.
Moving from cultural critique to teacher education, Hugh Socket—in his book
Knowledge and Virtue in Teaching and Learning: The Primacy of Dispositions38—
shows that we can make goals and aims explicit, and use assessment to help future
teachers reach those goals, in ways that are not pejoratively mimetic. Sockett does
the difficult—but invaluable—work of making what philosophically informed
teaching might look like more explicit to teachers and teacher educators by offering
heuristics (rubrics, questions for pre-service teachers and teacher educators) that
aim to facilitate growth toward meaningful—even if impossible to make
algorithmic—goals. While it is important to criticize assessments pre-service
teachers are subjected to—be it InTASC standards or EdTPA exams—and while it is
important to recognize the political nature of these assessments, there is still
conceptually work to be done. We can keep working on alternatives, while exploring
whether or not the current standards are as pejoratively mimetic as they might
initially appear. For example, InTASC standard nine is on ethical practice, and it is
hard to see why more philosophers aren’t engaged with defining what ethical
practice means and how we can help teach teachers—using exemplars and
rubrics—to make their work more ethical.39 I don’t think it is enough to wish that
teachers were more moral in their practices, or to praise the moral when we see it; if
we are engaged in the work of teacher education, we should empower teachers to
realize the aims that we value through assessment and adaptive education. This is
why I find Sockett’s work so valuable. It is one thing to be critical of exams, but it is
far more valuable to do everything in our power to build a framework that allows
the values that we find lacking in education to flourish. Teachers will always be
assessed; instead of seeing assessment as a necessary evil, I believe we have an
opportunity to see assessment as a transformative possibility. Developing a future
teacher’s moral life in schools will most certainly not entail providing scripts, or
offering algorithms, but reading foundational texts in education—something
Jackson suggests in “Facing Our Ignorance”—is also (for many teachers) not enough
either. Foundational texts and reflection are necessary, but they aren’t sufficient.
Future teachers need to learn how to enact aims in practice,40 and they need
feedback that will allow them to more powerfully enact—and reflect on—their aims.
Sockett does this well, but when it comes to aims and their enactment, more voices
are needed. We know that aims can be contentious, and it is important for
philosophers of education to try to spell out the aims they find most important for
teachers to enact in the classroom. But, the work cannot stop there. Philosophers of
education can also think through the types of assessment that might facilitate
growth toward those aims. It is important to move beyond critique and to the
development of a conversation on aims and how they are enacted. Again, this may
feel like a mimetic project, but I think the way to large-scale transformations of

teaching and classroom life is making aims explicit and finding assessments that
allow teachers to adapt their instruction to help students realize those aims.
One of the most promising recent developments along this front is Mary
Kennedy’s recent article: “Parsing Teaching.”41 Kennedy makes the case that we can
decompose teaching—a recent goal in teacher education literature42—into
component parts that can be reproduced in the classroom, but how we combine
these parts, how we think about these parts coming together to form philosophically
defeasible, moral, teaching is something that is far more difficult to accomplish. As I
read Kennedy’s article, I can’t help but think she is calling for something like what
Jackson hoped to accomplish in “The Mimetic and the Transformative”: a way of
teaching where students learn the moves central to teaching (somewhat
mimetically), while having the ability to rethink how these moves fit together and
are reconstructed to serve new students, different contexts and evolving aims.
Future teachers need to learn the moves—how to “enlist student participation,” how
to “contain behavior,” and so on—but these moves cannot be applied mechanically
and often come in conflict. As such, teachers also need to be taught—through
observations and readings on exemplary performances by teachers, through
facilitated reflection, etc.—what it would mean to enact a moral classroom in the
light of all of the complexities of teaching. Philosophers of education can be valuable
co-workers—with teacher educators and teachers—in projects like this.
Finally, I want to bring our attention to two approaches to teaching
prominent in K-12 schools, and approaches that I teach my future teachers:
differentiated instruction43 and Understand by Design (UbD).44 Both of these
approaches to teaching put assessment first, both are adaptive forms of instructions,
but both also put transformative teaching first. In fact, both approaches make the
strong point that learning cannot happen most effectively for every student unless
the teacher has a clear learning target and uses assessment to help each student
reach that target. Differentiated instruction and UbD are premised on the belief that
it is unfair to judge students against an ineffable standard, and a belief that
ambitious goals can guide adaptive instruction. That is, we can create rubrics and
provide instances of exemplary performance—excellence in poetry, excellence in
interpretation, excellence in creativity in math and science—so as to help students
toward what was hitherto taken to be near impossible to teach. More, making the
ineffable explicit does not cheapen or lesson what is learned; it doesn’t limit
creativity: it empowers students. Adapting instruction doesn’t mean taking steps to
a predetermined end, but it does mean having ambitious goals in mind and knowing
how to use assessment to help students reach these goals. As a philosopher of
education, I find these approaches to teaching extremely effective and interesting,
but—to my knowledge—there are not many philosophically informed discussions of
these prominent approaches to teaching in the philosophy of education literature.45
I think this is a shame, because a close look at differentiated instruction and UbD
show how adaptive education—guided by assessment—can fit squarely within the
transformative tradition of teaching. Teachers who practice differentiated
instruction don’t see teaching as leading students lockstep to a predetermined end;
they use assessment to free students to realize an ambitious instructional goal
through a variety of processes, through creating a variety of products and utilizing a

variety of content. Jackson engages closely with mimetic teaching brilliantly in Life
in Classrooms, and I think it is important to engage with prominent practices like
differentiation and UbD today to see if—even in our mimetic educational era—new
forms of transformative teaching are occurring precisely though the use of
assessment and adaptive instruction.
While Jackson was clearly skeptical of adaptive instruction and assessment, I
think we need to rethink this skepticism and see the ways in which adaptive
instruction and assessment can be transformative. It may be the case that making
things explicit—having clear learning goals, discussing the norms that are
controlling inside and outside the classroom—may have a leveling effect—limiting
creativity and philosophical insight—but I think we need to test this hypothesis. I
am of the mind that making things explicit through assessment targets will lead to
transformative outcomes for many students who are currently underserved by
current classroom practices.46 Combining the skepticism of the Jackson who wrote
“The Mimetic and the Transformative: Alternative Outlooks on Teaching” with the
keen eye for classroom practices embodied by his Life in Classrooms will—I feel—
help us see ways in which what we may take to be mimetic practices harbor the
transformative, and—in doing this—lead to new futures for philosophers of
education. In the end, I think this approach will allow us to be far more critical of
pejoratively mimetic education, while allowing transformative education new
possibilities. Adaptive education—guided by assessment—can lead to student
growth and empowerment; it also offers philosophers of education opportunities to
reengage with larger conversations in education. These conversations need the
voice of philosophers of education. As a field, we need to think through how
assessment and adaptive education—which are clearly going to remain central to
classroom practice, and which have been demonstrated to be effective by
educational researchers47—can be transformative, and philosophers of education
may be uniquely suited to doing the conceptual work of showing how a new
tradition of teaching might emerge because of this.
Conclusions
Conceptual work alone will not—to be sure—lead to political changes that will
upend our mimetic educational era. Nonetheless, without a vision, possibilities
perish. Jackson knew, as we do now, that individual teachers are finding ways to
combine what is good in the mimetic and transformative teaching traditions, but
given the overall climate of teaching these individual voices are not enough to
change conversations. Dewey laments this fact in The Sources of a Science of
Education. He writes:
the successes of such individuals [exceptional teachers] tend to be born and
to die with them: beneficial consequences extend to those pupils who have
personal contact with such gifted teachers. No one can measure that waste
and loss that have come from the fact that the contributions of such men and
women in the past have been thus confined, and the only way by which we
can prevent such waste in the future is by methods which enable us to make

an analysis of what the gifted teacher does intuitively, so that something
accruing from his work can be communicated to others.48
As I read this quote, I see Dewey calling for closer partnerships between
philosophers of education, teacher educators and teachers. If our hope is to forge a
new tradition of teaching where assessment and adaptive instruction are used to
promote transformative ends, there is a lot to learn from teachers who are finding
ways to enact transformative teaching in a mimetic era. Concept-building is
important. Doris Santoro found a language—demoralization—that fits what
teaching looks like in our era, and I think we might do something similar when it
comes to the mimetic and the transformative. Assessment can be terribly miseducative and constraining. The term “eduprenuerial” adaptive education49 sounds
nightmarish. But, this doesn’t mean that assessment and adaptive education cannot
be transformative. In fact, and as I hope to have shown above, the transformative is
given new possibilities because of assessment and adaptive education. What is
needed is a new language of teaching that moves beyond the mimetic and the
transformative, and to a language that does justice to all of those individual teachers
doing good work with assessment and adaptive instruction, and all of those
individual philosophers of education conceptualizing futures for education, and all
of those parents, citizens and students who can feel and see the potential in our
educational present that lies dormant. Individuals are not enough; what is needed is
work on a vision beyond the mimetic and transformative that will usher in an era
where assessment and adaptive instruction are used to promote the potential of
each learner. Again, politics are important, and our current era is pejoratively
mimetic. But, this shouldn’t keep us bound in and to a dualism; we need to see
assessment and adaptive instruction for what they can be: freeing, educative;
fostering spaces for teaching worthy of the name.
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